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Michigan Law Review
INCOME TAX-Listing Abandoned Residence for Sale
and Not for Rent Considered Sufficient To
Convert to "Property Held for the
Production of Income"-
Hulet P. Smith*
Since 1941, Hulet Smith and his wife had lived in a large house
in Arcadia, California, where Smith had been actively engaged in a
real estate loan business. In 1959, Smith decided to retire and move
to Pebble Beach, a distance of about 400 miles from Arcadia. He
purchased a parcel of land in Pebble Beach and built a large expen-
sive home, with the avowed intention of making this his permanent
personal residence. In 1961, after severing all business and social
connections in the vicinity of their old residence, Smith and his wife
moved into their new home, taking virtually all of their furnishings
with them.' At the same time Smith placed the Arcadia residence on
the market for sale, having decided not to offer it for rent, because
the rental income would have been insufficient to justify retention
of the property, and because rental would have obstructed sale.2
Smith and his wife filed joint returns for the years 1962 and 1963,
claiming as deductions depreciation and expenditures for main-
tenance and repair of the Arcadia property. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue disallowed these deductions and ordered a de-
ficiency assessment. The Tax Court, acting on the petition of Smith,
held, in a memorandum opinion, that throughout 1962 and 1963 the
Arcadia property was "held for the production of income" under
sections 167(a)(2) and 212(2) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
(Code),8 and thus that petitioner was entitled to deduct depreciation
* 1967 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,028 [hereinafter cited as principal case].
1. Most of the permanent floor carpeting and even a truckload of plants and
flowers were removed from the old residence to be installed in the new Pebble
Beach home. Only window drapes and part of the carpeting were left behind.
2. The premises would have had to have been leased for at least two years in
order to induce a tenant to make the expenditures necessary to render the house
habitable, and, in any case, rental would have made the showing of the house tQ
prospective purchasers more difficult.
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167 provides, in part:
Sec. 167. DEPRECIATION.
(a) GENERAL RuLE. There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a
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and maintenance expenditures in both years.4 If a former residence
is permanently abandoned and placed on the market for sale only,
such property may be sufficiently converted to "property held for the
production of income" to qualify for depreciation and maintenance
expense deductions arising after such conversion.
Sections 167(a)(2) and 212(2) of the 1954 Code, under which the
deductions in the principal case for depreciation and maintenance
expenses were allowed, are almost identical to their predecessors,
sections 23(l)(2) and 23(a)(2), 5 which were added to the 1989 Code
as amendments by the Revenue Act of 19426 to allow the taxpayer to
deduct for the depreciation and the ordinary and necessary main-
tenance expenses of property "held for the production of income"
but not used in a "trade or business." Under these sections,8 property
is considered to be "held for the production of income" even if the
only anticipated income is that which would accrue on the disposi-
tion of the property, and even though there is no guarantee that the
property will be sold at a profit or otherwise be productive of
income.9
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, Wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence)-.
(2) of property held for the production of income.
INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 212 provides, in part,
Sec. 212. EXPENSES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF INCOME.
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(2) for the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for
the production of income;
4. Principal case 67,165, at 67-165.
5. George W. Mitchell, 47 T.C. 120 (1966); Frederich H. Prince Trust, 35 T.C. 974
(1961).
6. Revenue Act of 1942, § 121, 56 Stat. 819.
7. The congressional purpose in amending § 23 of the 1939 Code is summarized
as follows:
The existing law allows the taxpayer to deduct expenses incurred in connection
with a trade or business. Due partly to the inadequacy of the statute and partly
to court decisions, nontrade or nonbusilness expenses are not deductible, although
nontrade or nonbusiness income is fully subject to tax. The bill corrects this
inequity by allowing all of the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
for the production or collection of income, or for management, conservation or
maintenance of property held for the production of income. ThUs, whether or
not the expense is in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business, if it is
expended in the pursuit of income or in connection with property held for the
production of income, it is allowable.
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1942); see S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1957).
8. The criteria for determining whether or not property is "held for the
production of income" are the same under sections 167 and 212, and thus, if the
holding of property satisfies one section, the other section will also be satisfied.
George W. Mitchell, 47 T.C. 120 (1966); Eleanor Saltonstall, rev'd on other grounds,
148 F.2d 396 (1945); Mary Laughlin Robinson, 2 T.C. 305 (1943).
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1957).
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Although in enacting sections 167 and 212 Congress thus in-
tended to allow the taking of nonbusiness deductions, section 262
remains as a bar to deductions of personal, living, or family ex-
penses.10 Expenses incurred prior to or in connection with the sale
of a personal residence appear to be within this category and conse-
quently would not ordinarily be deductible." In any particular case,
then, it is crucial to determine whether the personal residence has
been converted into property "held for the production of income,"
so as to permit deductions for depreciation and maintenance ex-
penses.12 By its decision in the principal case, the Tax Court has
apparently abolished a traditional prerequisite for the conversion
of residential property into income producing property: a bona fide
offer to rent the abandoned residence. As a result, a taxpayer may
now be able to establish conversion merely by abandoning his former
residence and holding it for sale. Thus, the principal case has created
a new test for conversion, which, it is submitted, cannot be supported
by the three cases upon which the court relied.
Mary Laughlin Robinson'3 is a landmark decision which has
often been cited for the proposition that the taxpayer-owner must
make efforts to rent an abandoned residence in order to qualify for
deductions for maintenance expenses and depreciation. 14 In Robin-
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 262 provides:
Sec. 262. PERSONAL, LIVING, AND FAMILY EXPENSES.
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be
allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.
II. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (1965) gives examples of personal, living, and family
expenses. Among these are expenses of maintaining a household and losses sustained
by the taxpayer on the sale or other disposition of property held for personal, living
and family purposes.
12. This problem should be distinguished from that arising under § 165(c) of
the Code allowing a deduction for losses incurred in "any transaction entered into
for profit, though not connected with a trade or business." In order to take such a
deduction upon sale of property formerly used as a personal residence, there must
have been an actual rental of the property and not merely an offering for rent.
See, e.g., Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U.S. 582 (1928) (allowing the loss deduction where
there had been actual rental); William C. Horrmann, 17 T.C. 903 (1951); Allen L.
Grammer, 12 T.C. 34 (1949) (disallowing the deduction when not rented but merely
listed for rent). A deduction was also denied, for the same reason in Phipps v.
Helvering, 124 F.2d 292 (1941); Morgan v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 390 (1935);
Howard Oats, 37 B.T.A. 571 (1938). However, when the property was never used for
personal purposes, actual rental (showing a transaction entered into for profit) will
not be required. See George W. Carnick, 9 T.C. 756 (1947); Estell G. Marx, 5 T.C. 173
(1945).
13. 2 T.C. 305 (1943).
14. See also Charles F. Neave, 17 T.C. 1237 (1952), where, although property was
periodically rented, it was not offered for rent continually during the period offered
for sale. The Court held that no conversion to income producing purposes had
occurred merely because property was offered for sale, and that temporary rental for
a few months was not determinative. In William C. Horrmann, 17 T.C. 903 (1951),
deductions were allowed where the abandoned property was offered for both sale or
rent. The Tax Court in Clarence B. Jones, 22 T.C. 407 (1954), allowed deductions on
a converted summer residence, but only after offered for rent or sale (stating that
an offer for sale was not enough), but allowing deductions for the winter season
[Vol. 66
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son, the taxpayer offered her former residence for rent or sale and
made diligent efforts to find either prospective tenants or purchasers.
On its facts, then, the case held only that where a taxpayer abandons
residential property and attempts to rent as well as to sell, he will
meet the requirements for conversion, although the court did note in
dictum that "production of income can include gain from the dis-
position of property." Thus, the court in the principal case was
unwarranted in reading Robinson to support the proposition that
abandonment coupled only with an offer to sell is sufficient for
conversion.
A second case cited by the Tax Court in attempting to find
precedent for its holding in the principal case is George W. Mitchell,15
in which petitioners and two other joint venturers purchased non-
residential property at an auction, held it without advertising it for
sale or rent, and claimed a depreciation deduction. The court allowed
the deduction, finding an intent to hold the property for income
producing purposes, and citing Robinson for the proposition that
"income" includes "gain from the disposition of property." In the
principal case, however, the Tax Court failed to mention that in
Mitchell the taxpayers had never used the property as a personal
residence; they had purchased the property solely for investment
purposes. Thus, the question of conversion from personal use to
income producing purposes was not in issue, and the Mitchell de-
cision would seem to offer little support for the result reached in the
principal case.
Briley v. United States,16 the third case cited, is, like Robinson,
a case in which the property in question, after having been aban-
doned as a residence, was offered by the taxpayer for either sale or
rent. The issue here, however, was not whether there had been a
though not put up for rent during the winter on proof that the house was not
suited for winter residence. A recent case citing Robinson (see note 13 supra) is Paul
F. Stutz, 1965 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,166, in which abandoned residential property
was offered for rent until March 23, 1960, and after that held for sale only. Mainte-
nance and depreciation deductions were allowed only for the period to March 23
and not thereafter. Deductions were allowed in Helene Irwin Fagan, 1950 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 50,017 and Anna C. Newberry, 1945 P-fI Tax Ct. Mem. 45,077, even
though there was no offer to rent in either case. In neither case, however, was the
property used as a residence. Cases denying deductions because of failure to make a
bona fide offer of rent include: Frederich H. Prince Trust, 85 T.C. 974 (1961) and
Eugene H. Walet, Jr., 31 T.C. 461 (1958), aff'd per curiam, 272 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.
1959) (both of which involved rent free occupancy); Ebb James Ford, Jr., 29 T.C. 499
(1957) (taxpayer lived on the property while offering for rent); and Warren Leslie, Sr.,
6 T.C. 488 (1946) (which included a rigorous dissent to the effect that proof of
property being no longer suitable for residential use should be sufficient to establish
conversion to income producing purposes). Other cases denying deductions include:
James Parks Bradley, 30 T.C. 701 (1958); John M. Coulter, 1950 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
50,077; Charles S. Guggenheimer, 1943 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 43,432.
15. 47 T.C. 120 (1966).
16. 189 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
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conversion, but whether the rental offer had been bona fide. The
government contention that there had been no bona fide offering for
rent was rejected by the court, and the deductions were allowed.
Thus, there seems to be no case authority for the Tax Court's
holding in the principal case. Neither is there authority in the
Treasury Regulations. Although Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1
(b) states, as did Robinson, that "income" includes gain from the
disposition of property, Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1(h) pro-
vides:
Ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in connection
with the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for use as a residence by the taxpayer are not deductible.
However, ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in
connection with the management, conservation or maintenance
of property held by the taxpayer as rental property are deduc-
tible even though such property was formerly held by the tax-
payer for use as a home. [Emphasis added.]
Relying upon the first sentence of this regulation, it might be argu-
able that once a taxpayer abandons his residence, he no longer holds
it "for use as a residence," and thus the prohibition against the listed
deductions is not applicable. Such an interpretation, however, would
render superfluous the second sentence which specifically allows
deductions with respect to a former residence held as "rental prop-
erty." By implication, then, the regulations require a rental offer
to convert a former residence to income producing property.17
Since the rental offer requirement was not derived directly from
the statute, but was adopted by the courts and by the Internal
Revenue Service, the courts are competent to change the require-
ment according to their interpretation of the statute.18 Moreover,
there may be some policy justification for eliminating a rental offer
as a sine qua non for conversion. If a taxpayer purchases residential
property as an investment, never living in it, he is entitled to deduc-
tions for maintenance expenses and depreciation. When he sells the
property, he will be taxed on his profits, measured by the excess of
the selling price over the adjusted basis. 19 Similarly, if a taxpayer
17. See note 8 supra.
18. It should be emphasized, however, that a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction
only if he comes under the terms of a statute allowing such a deduction. Moreover,
the burden of proof lies on the taxpayer. See, e.g., New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934):
The power to tax income.., is plain and extends to the gross income. Whether
and to what extent deductions shal be allowed depends upon legislative grace;
and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be
allowed.. . . Obviously, therefore, a taxpayer seeking a deduction must be able
to point to an applicable statute and show that be comes within its terms.
19. INr. REV. CoDn. or 1954, § 1001. The gain from the sale will be taxed at capital
gains rates under § 1221, subject to the recapture provisions of § 1250, taxing at
ordinary income rates a percentage of an amount equal to the allowance for depreci-
ation taken in the year of sale.
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ceases to use property as his personal residence but continues to hold
it for investment purposes, then, regardless of whether the requisite
elements of conversion are established, he will be taxed, when he
sells, on the excess of his selling price over his adjusted basis, includ-
ing the portion of such excess that accrues after abandonment. It
seems unfair and discriminatory to deny the taxpayer in the latter
case the opportunity to deduct for maintenance expenses and de-
preciation during the period after abandonment simply because he
had formerly used the property as his residence and had failed to offer
it for rent after abandonment. Moreover, the rental rule might dis-
courage the holding of a former personal residence for investment
purposes in situations in which it is disadvantageous to offer for
rent.20
It can be argued, however, that the rental offer requirement is
not overly prohibitive in effect. A taxpayer is free to set the terms of
his rental offer within a wide range of alternatives. He could, for ex-
ample, offer to rent for successive short periods, while retaining the
right to show the property to potential purchasers. Such non-restric-
tive provisions would generally not disqualify the offer to rent as a
bona fide offer.21 Furthermore, under the traditional rule, the tax-
payer, while making such a rental offer, may simultaneously offer to
sell.22 Thus, in many cases the rental requirement may amount to
little more than a formality, since if a taxpayer has in fact abandoned
his residence, it will not be disadvantageous for him to offer for rent.
The above argument may prove too much, however, since it
suggests that it may be too easy to comply with the rental require-
ment. It is doubtful that a condition so easily satisfied can ac-
20. For example, where rental will involve too much trouble for the taxpayer, or
where rental may obstruct his opportunity to sell should he feel the value of his
property is declining. In fact, the principal case is an instance in which the taxpayer
did not offer for rent for these very reasons, See note 2 supra.
21. While the courts are generally willing to consider whether an offer to rent is
bona fide, they have generally held against the taxpayer only where such offers or
actual rental are dearly sham transactions. See, e.g., Paul F. Stutz, 1965 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 65,166 (discussed in note 14 supra) where the court held that efforts to rent
were more than a mere token, and there was a bona fide offer to rent. There are,
however, cases reaching contrary results. See, e.g., Charles F. Neave, 17 T.C. 1237 (1952)
(discussed in note 14 supra) (temporary renting for a few months during the summer
not determinative where rental is for an unusually low amount and other circum-
stances do not indicate a bona fide offering for rent); Charles S. Guggenheimer, 1943
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 43,432 (not sufficient that real estate dealers in the community
were aware that the owners were willing to rent); S. Wise, 1945 P-H Tax Ct, Mem.
45,298 (minimal amounts expended for advertising ($72.75) and putting up signs
not suffident). See also Briley v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Ohio 1960); text
accompanying note 16 supra. No cases were found where the terms of an otherwise
earnest offer to rent were the basis of a finding that the offer was a sham. It is prob-
able that only where the terms indicate clearly that a mere token offering is being
made, will the courts fail to recognize the offer as bona fide. Few such cases ever
reach the courts, possibly because such a factual determination seems particularly
well suited for settlement at the return audit stage.
22. See Mary Laughlin Robinson, 2 T.C. 305 (1943).
January 1968]
Michigan Law Review
complish its intended purpose: manifestation of conversion to in-
come producing property. Moreover, there are cases where the
necessity of making a rental offer may create a real hardship to a
taxpayer who should receive the tax advantages of conversion. For
example, a taxpayer may abandon his residence and purchase sur-
rounding lots for the purpose of developing and later selling the
land. Here the making of an offer to rent may be neither practicable
nor appropriate.23 Thus, the application of the rental offer require-
ment can produce anomalous results. On the one hand, a taxpayer
who ceases to use property as a residence and intends to continue
to hold it as a bona fide investment, but who, for some reason, does
not wish to rent, will be denied deductions for maintenance expenses
and depreciation. On the other hand, a taxpayer who desires only
to find a buyer for his abandoned residence can obtain the deductions
merely by offering to rent on such illusory terms as those outlined
in the preceding paragraph. The rental rule, then, creates an arbi-
trary barrier to the benefits of conversion in some cases, while pre-
senting an ineffective barrier to the improper taking of deductions
in others.
Ideally, the standard for conversion should discriminate between
the following two types of cases: first, abandonment where the tax-
payer wishes to sell his property immediately at the market price,
but tries to obtain deductions while searching for a buyer; second,
abandonment where the taxpayer wishes to hold his property as an
investment, with appreciation in value being at least one of his
objectives, but with no plan to sell at any particular time. Clearly,
maintenance and depreciation deductions should be denied in the
first case and allowed in the second case. There are, of course, cases
between these extremes. For example, a taxpayer on abandoning his
residence may decide that since the market price is too low, he will
wait to sell until he can obtain what he considers to be a suitable
price. Arguably, he is holding for appreciation in value, but his
continued ownership more likely represents some disagreement as to
the fair market value of the property, and as such indicates that he
is simply trying to dispose of personal, rather than income, property.
An even harder case may be presented by the taxpayer who wishes
to sell his property for considerably more than the price he is offered
at the time he abandons.
As a practical matter, the rental rule seems to be an admission
that a case by case determination of the taxpayer's motive is too
23. Even without purchasing surrounding property, if a taxpayer subdivides his
original lot for the purpose of development and sale of the property in separate
parcels, this conduct may be sufficient to demonstrate legitimate conversion. This
determination is obviously subjective, and the relevant factors will vary from case to
case; however, it is hoped that in exceptional cases, the taxpayer who wishes to
convert his abandoned residence into true investment property will be able to satisfy
his burden of proof and establish conversion without having to suffer the additional
burden of offering his property for rent.
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difficult; thus, a formal test is substituted, under which deductions
are generally allowed in all of the cases described above as long as
there is a bona fide offer to rent. The principal case, on the other
hand, seems to take a more liberal view in allowing deductions in
all cases upon proof of actual abandonment, whether or not there
has been an accompanying offer to rent. If the court is requiring
something in addition to abandonment as a test for conversion, the
other indicia are not adequately identified in the opinion. Such a
position leads both to uncertainty as to the present criteria for con-
version, and, in the principal case, to a decision which on its facts
seems dearly incorrect. Smith did nothing other than abandon and
continually attempt to sell his residence. His holding of the property
for two years probably indicated only that his asking price was
higher than anyone wished to pay. Thus, for all that appears, Smith
was attempting to sell a personal, rather than an income producing,
piece of property. A test for conversion requiring only abandonment
thus produces an unsatisfactory result.
As between the rental rule and the rule apparently laid down in
the principal case, then, the former seems preferable in that it re-
quires something more than mere abandonment. An offering for
rent at least demonstrates a non-personal, income producing use of
the property, regardless of the taxpayer's motive for so offering. If
the rental rule is to remain, however, two changes appear salutary.
First, it should be recognized that there may be exceptional situa-
tions in which deductions should be allowed even in the absence of
an offer to rent. In such cases, the taxpayer should have the burden of
proving both conversion and the impossibility or substantial im-
practicality of rental. Second, in situations in which there has been
a rental offer, a more careful inquiry should be made to insure that
the offer is bona fide and is not simply a cover to give the taxpayer
deductions for personal expenses while he disposes of his former
residence.24 The two proposals will demand some consideration of
the circumstances surrounding a particular abandonment and will
perhaps invite some degree of uncertainty. However, with an appro-
priately rigorous burden on the taxpayer to show legitimate invest-
ment purposes,25 it is believed that the suggested inquiries will
eliminate the manipulation of the rental offer requirement to obtain
unwarranted tax benefits and will accommodate only the true in-
vestor.
24. Such an inquiry was made in Paul F. Stutz, 1965 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,166;
Charles F. Neave, 7 T.C. 1237 (1952); S. Wise, 1945 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 45,298;
Charles S Guggenheimer, 1943 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 43,432. The difficulty of making
such a determination, however, is well illustrated by the taxpayer who sets his
rental price just slightly above what the market will allow. Of course, if the taxpayer
continually rejects potential rental offers, this could be acceptable as proof that there
was no bona fide offer to rent.
25. See note 23 supra.
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